

A THEORY OF METAMOTIVATION : THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTING OF THE VALUE-LIFE*

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I

Self-actualizing individuals (more matured, more fully-human), by definition, already suitably gratified in their basic needs, are now motivated in other higher ways, to be called "metamotivations."

By definition, self-actualizing people are gratified in all their basic needs (of belongingness, affection, respect, and self-esteem). This is to say that they have a feeling of belongingness and rootedness, they are satisfied in their love needs, have friends and feel loved and love-worthy, they have status and place in life and respect from other people, and they have a reasonable feeling of worth and self-respect. If we phrase this negatively — in terms of the frustration of these basic needs and in terms of pathology — then this is to say that self-actualizing people do not (for any length of time) feel anxiety-ridden, insecure, unsafe, do not feel alone, ostracized, rootless, or isolated, do not feel unlovable, rejected, or unwanted, do not feel despised and looked down upon, and do not feel deeply unworthy, nor do they have crippling feelings of inferiority or worthlessness (Maslow, 1954, Chap. 12).

Of course this can be phrased in other ways and this I have done. For instance, since the basic needs had been assumed to be the only motivations for human beings, it was possible, and in certain contexts also useful, to say of self-actualizing people that they were "unmotivated" (Maslow, 1954, Chap. 15). This was to align these people with the Eastern philosophical view of health as the transcendence of striving or desiring or wanting. (And something of the sort was also true of the Roman stoic view.)

It was also possible to describe self-actualizing people as expressing rather than coping, and to stress that they were spontaneous, and natural, that they were more easily themselves than other people. This phrasing had the additional usefulness of being compatible with the view of neurosis as an understandable coping mechanism and as a reasonable (though stupid and fearful) effort to satisfy the needs of a deeper-lying, more intrinsic, more biological self (Maslow, 1965, pp. 33-47; 1967).

Each of these phrasings has its own operational usefulness in par-

* The twenty-eight italicized theses listed here are presented as testable propositions.

ticular research contexts, But it is also true that for certain purposes it is best to ask the questions, "What motivates the self-actualizing person? What are the psychodynamics in self-actualization? What makes him move and act and struggle? What drives (or pulls) such a person on? What attracts him? For what does he hope? What makes him angry, or dedicated, or self-sacrificing? What does he feel loyal to? Devoted to? What does he value, aspire to, and yearn for? What would he die (or live) for?"

Clearly we must make an immediate distinction between the ordinary motives of people below the level of self-actualization — that is, people motivated by the basic needs — and the motivations of people who are sufficiently gratified in all their basic needs and therefore are no longer motivated by them primarily, but rather by "higher" motivations. It is therefore convenient to call these higher motives and needs of self-actualizing persons by the name "metaneeds" and also to differentiate the category of motivation from the category of "metamotivation."

(It is now more clear to me that gratification of the basic needs is not a sufficient condition for metamotivation, although it may be a necessary precondition. I have individual subjects in whom apparent basic-need-gratification is compatible with "existential neurosis," meaninglessness, valuelessness, or the like. Metamotivation now seems *not* to ensue automatically after basic-need-gratification. One must speak also of the additional variable of "defenses against metamotivation" [Maslow, 1967]. This implies that, for the strategy of communication and of theory-building, it may turn out to be useful to add to the definition of the self-actualizing person, not only [a] that he be sufficiently free of illness, [b] that he be sufficiently gratified in his basic needs, and [c] that he be positively using his capacities, but also [d] that he be motivated by some values which he strives for or gropes for and to which he is loyal.)

II

All such people are devoted to some task, call, vocation, beloved work ("outside themselves").

In examining self-actualizing people directly, I find that in all cases, at least in our culture, they are dedicated people, devoted to some task "outside themselves," some vocation, or duty, or beloved job. Generally the devotion and dedication is so marked that one can fairly use the old words vocation, calling, or mission to describe their passionate, selfless, and profound feeling for their "work." We could even use the words destiny or fate. I have sometimes gone so far as to speak of oblation in the religious sense, in the sense of offering oneself or dedicating oneself upon some altar for some particular task, some cause outside oneself and bigger than oneself, something not merely selfish, something impersonal.

I think it is possible to go pretty far with the notion of destiny or

fate. This is a way of putting into inadequate words the feeling that one gets when one listens to self-actualizing people (and some others) talking about their work or task (Maslow, 1965). One gets the feeling of a beloved job, and, furthermore, of something for which the person is a "natural," something that he is suited for, something that is right for him, even something that he was born for. It is easy to sense something like a pre-established harmony or, perhaps one could say, a good match like the perfect love affair or friendship, in which it seems that people belong to each other and were meant for each other. In the best instances, the person and his job fit together and belong together perfectly like a key and a lock, or perhaps resonate together like a sung note which sets into sympathetic resonance a particular string in the piano keyboard.

It should be said that the above seems to hold true for my female subjects even though in a different sense. I have at least one woman subject who devoted herself entirely to the task of being the mother, the wife, the housewife and the clan matriarch. Her vocation, one could very reasonably call it, was to bring up her children, to make her husband happy, and to hold together a large number of relatives in a network of personal relations. This she did very well and, as nearly as I could make out, this she enjoyed. She loved her lot completely and totally, never yearning for anything else so far as I could tell, and using all her capacities well in the process. Other women subjects have had various combinations of home life and professional work outside the home which could produce this same sense of dedication to something perceived simultaneously, both as beloved and also as important and worthwhile doing. In some women, I have also been tempted to think of "having a baby" as fullest self-actualization all by itself, at least for a time. However, I should say that I feel less confident in speaking of self-actualization in women.

III

In the ideal instance, inner requiredness coincides with external requiredness, "I want to" with "I must."

I often get the feeling in this kind of situation that I can tease apart two kinds of determinants of this transaction (or alloying, fusion, or chemical reaction) which has created a unity out of a duality, and that these two sets of determinants can and sometimes do vary independently. One can be spoken of as the responses within the person, e.g., "I love babies (or painting, or research, or political power) more than anything in the world. I am fascinated with it. . . . I am inexorably drawn to . . . I need to . . ." This we may call "inner requiredness" and it is felt as a kind of self-indulgence rather than as a duty. It is different from and separable from "external requiredness," which is rather felt as a response to what the environment, the situation, the problem, the external world calls for or requires of the person, as a fire "calls for" putting out, or as a helpless baby demands that one

take care of it, or as some obvious injustice calls for righting (Maslow, 1963). Here one feels more the element of duty, or obligation, or responsibility, of being compelled helplessly to respond no matter what one was planning to do, or wished to do. It is more "I must, I have to, I am compelled" than "I want to."

In the ideal instance, which fortunately also happens in fact in many of my instances, "I want to" coincides with "I must." There is a good matching of inner with outer requiredness. And the observer is then overawed by the degree of compellingness, of inexorability, of pre-ordained destiny, necessity and harmony that he perceives. Furthermore, the observer (as well as the person involved) feels not only that "it has to be" but also that "it ought to be, it is right, it is suitable, appropriate, fitting, and proper." I have often felt a gestalt-like quality about this kind of belonging together, the formation of a "one" out of "two."

I hesitate to call this simply "purposefulness" because that may imply that it happens only out of will, purpose, decision, or calculation, and doesn't give enough weight to the subjective feeling of being swept along, of willing and eager surrender, or yielding to fate and happily embracing it at the same time. Ideally, one also *discovers* one's fate; it is not only made or constructed or decided upon. It is recognized as if one had been unwittingly waiting for it. Perhaps the better phrase would be "Spinozistic" or "Taoistic" choice or decision or purpose — or even will.

The best way to communicate these feelings to someone who doesn't intuitively, directly understand them is to use as a model "falling in love." This is clearly different from doing one's duty, or doing what is sensible or logical. And clearly also "will," if mentioned at all, is used in a very special sense. And when two people love each other fully, then each one knows what it feels like to be magnet and what it feels like to be iron filings, and what it feels like to be both simultaneously.

IV

This ideal situation generates feelings of good fortune and also of ambivalence and unworthiness.

This model also helps to convey what is difficult to communicate in words, that is, their sense of good fortune, of luck, of gratuitous grace, of awe that this miracle should have occurred, of wonder that they should have been chosen, and of the peculiar mixture of pride fused with humility, of arrogance shot through with the pity-for-the-less-fortunate that one finds in lovers.

Of course the possibility of good fortune and success also can set into motion all sorts of neurotic fears, feelings of unworthiness, counter-values, Jonah-syndrome dynamics (Maslow, 1967), etc. These defenses against our highest possibilities must be overcome before the highest values can be wholeheartedly embraced.

At this level the dichotomizing of work and play is transcended; wages, hobbies, vacations, etc., must be defined at a higher level.

And then, of course, it can be said of such a person with real meaningfulness that he is being his own kind of person, or being himself, or actualizing his real self. An abstract statement, an extrapolation out from this kind of observation toward the ultimate and perfect ideal would run something like this: This person is the best one in the whole world for this particular job, and this particular job is the best job in the whole world for this particular person and his talents, capacities, and tastes. He was meant for it, and it was meant for him.

Of course, as soon as we accept this and get the feel of it, then we move over into another realm of discourse, i.e., the realm of being (Maslow, 1962a; Maslow, 1962b), of transcendence. Now we can speak meaningfully only in the language of being ("The B-language," communication at the mystical level, etc.). For instance, it is quite obvious with such people that the ordinary or conventional dichotomy between work and play is transcended totally (Marcuse, 1955; Maslow, 1965). That is, there is certainly no distinction between work and play in such a person in such a situation. His work is his play and his play is his work. If a person loves his work and enjoys it more than any other activity in the whole world and is eager to get to it, to get back to it after any interruption, then how can we speak about "labor" in the sense of something one is forced to do against one's wishes?

What sense, for instance, is left to the concept "vacation"? For such individuals it is often observed that during their vacations, that is, during the periods in which they are totally free to choose whatever they wish to do and in which they have no external obligations to anyone else, that it is precisely in such periods that they devote themselves happily and totally to their "work." Or, what does it mean "to have some fun," to seek amusement? What is now the meaning of the word "entertainment"? How does such a person "rest"? What are his "duties," responsibilities, obligations? What is his "hobby"?

What meaning does money or pay or salary have in such a situation? Obviously the most beautiful fate, the most wonderful good fortune that can happen to any human being, is to be paid for doing that which he passionately loves to do. This is exactly the situation, or almost the situation, with many (most?) of my subjects. Of course money is welcome, and in certain amounts is needed. But it is certainly not the finality, the end, the ultimate goal (that is, in the affluent society, and for the fortunate man). The salary check such a man gets is only a small part of his "pay." Self-actualizing work or B-work (work at the level of being), being its own intrinsic reward, transforms the money or pay-check into a by-product, an epiphenomenon. This is, of course, very different from the situation of the large majority of human beings who do something they do not want to do in order to

get money, which they then use to get what they really want. The role of money in the realm of being is certainly different from the role of money in the realm of deficiencies and of basic needs.

Indeed, it is theoretically possible to conceive of people with a mission, or with some great duty, not being paid *at all* with money, but of preferring not to be bothered with it, as in some religious orders. That is, they would be paid in higher need and metaneed gratifications. My guess is that in a Eupsychia (Maslow, 1961, 1965), the leaders, the ones given power, the bosses, etc., had better be paid less money and own less objects than others in order to guard them from envy, jealousy, resentment, the "evil eye." In such a society, where arbitrary and stupid social injustices are minimized, and which therefore permits the full impact of biological inequality and "injustice" to be felt without any possibility of blaming or alibi, the biologically privileged superiors may have to be protected from the fury of resentment against their unmerited, biological good luck. "Biological injustice" is probably more productive of resentment than is social injustice, for which there is always an alibi.

It will help to make my point that these are scientific questions, and can be investigated in scientific ways, if I point out that they already have been investigated in monkeys and apes to a degree. The most obvious example, of course, is the rich research literature on monkey curiosity and other precursors of the human yearning for and satisfaction with the truth (Maslow, 1962a). But it will be just as easy in principle to explore the esthetic choices of these and other animals under conditions of fear, and of lack of fear, by healthy specimens or by unhealthy ones, under good choice conditions or bad ones, etc. So also for such other B-values as order, unity, justice, lawfulness, completion; it should be possible to explore these in animals, children, etc.

Of course, "highest" means also weakest, most expendable, least urgent, least conscious, most easily repressed (Maslow, 1954, Chap. 8). The basic needs, being prepotent, push to the head of the line, so to speak, being more necessary for life itself, and for sheer physical health and survival. And yet metamotivation *does* exist in the natural world and in ordinary human beings. Supernatural intervention is not needed in this theory, nor is it necessary to invent the B-values arbitrarily, or *a priori*, nor are they merely logical products or the products by fiat of an act of will. They can be uncovered or discovered by anyone who is willing and able to repeat these operations. That is, these propositions are verifiable or falsifiable, and they are repeatable. They can be operationally stated. Many of them can be made public or demonstrable, that is, perceived simultaneously by two or more investigators.

If, then, the higher life of values is open to scientific investigation and clearly lies within the jurisdiction of (humanistically defined) science (Polanyi, 1958; Maslow, 1966), we may reasonably affirm the likelihood of progress in this realm. The advancement of knowledge of the higher life of values should make possible not only greater under-

standing, but also should open up new possibilities of self-improvement, of improvement of the human species and of all its social institutions (Maslow, 1965). Of course, it goes without saying that we need not shiver at the thought of "the strategy of compassion" or of "spiritual technologies": obviously, they would have to be extremely different in kind from the "lower" strategies and technologies we now know.

VI

Such vocation-loving individuals tend to identify (introject, incorporate) with their "work" and to make it into a defining-characteristic of the self. It becomes part of the self.

If one asks such a person, i.e., self-actualizing, work-loving, "Who are you?" or "What are you?" he often tends to answer in terms of his "call," e.g., "I am a lawyer." "I am a mother." "I am a psychiatrist." "I am an artist," etc. That is, he tells you that he identifies his call with his identity, his self. It tends to be a label for the whole of him, i.e., it becomes a defining characteristic of the person.

Or, if one asks him, "Supposing you were not a scientist (or a teacher, or a pilot), then what would you be?" Or, "Supposing you were not a psychologist, then what?" It is my impression that his response is apt to be one of puzzlement, thoughtfulness, being taken aback, i.e., not having a ready answer. Or the response can be one of amusement, i.e., it is funny. In effect, the answer is, "If I were not a mother (anthropologist, industrialist), then I wouldn't be *me*. I would be someone else. And I can't imagine being someone else."

This kind of response parallels the confused response to the question, "Supposing you were a woman rather than a man?"

A tentative conclusion is then that in self-actualizing subjects, their beloved calling tends to be perceived as a defining characteristic of the self, to be identified with, incorporated, introjected. It becomes an inextricable aspect of one's being.

(I do not have experience with deliberately asking this same question of less fulfilled people. My impression is that the above generalization is less true for some people [for whom it is an extrinsic job] and that in other individuals the job or profession can become functionally autonomous, i.e., the person is *only* a lawyer and not a person apart from this.)

VII

The tasks to which they are dedicated seem to be interpretable as embodiments or incarnations of intrinsic values (rather than as a means to ends outside the work itself, and rather than as functionally autonomous). The tasks are loved (and introjected) BECAUSE they embody these values. That is, ultimately it is the values that are loved rather than the job as such.

If one asks these people why they love their work (or, more specifically, which are the moments of higher satisfaction in their work, which moments of reward make all the necessary chores worthwhile and acceptable, which are the peak moments or peak-experiences), one gets many specific and *ad hoc* answers of the type listed and summarized in Table 1.

TABLE 1

MOTIVATIONS AND GRATIFICATIONS OF SELF-ACTUALIZING PEOPLE, OBTAINED THROUGH THEIR WORK AS WELL AS IN OTHER WAYS. (THESE ARE IN ADDITION TO BASIC NEED GRATIFICATIONS)

Delight in bringing about justice.
Delight in stopping cruelty and exploitation.
Fighting lies and untruths.
They love virtue to be rewarded.
They seem to like happy endings, good completions.
They hate sin and evil to be rewarded, and they hate people to get away with it.
They are good punishers of evil.
They try to set things right, to clean up bad situations.
They enjoy doing good.
They like to reward and praise promise, talent, virtue, etc.
They avoid publicity, fame, glory, honors, popularity, celebrity, or at least do not seek it. It seems to be not awfully important one way or another.
They do not *need* to be loved by everyone.
They generally pick out their own causes, which are apt to be few in number, rather than responding to advertising or to campaigns or to other people's exhortations.
They tend to enjoy peace, calm, quiet, pleasantness, etc., and they tend *not* to like turmoil, fighting, war, etc. (they are *not* general-fighters on every front), and they can enjoy themselves in the middle of a "war."
They also seem practical and shrewd and realistic about it, more often than impractical. They like to be effective and dislike being ineffectual.
Their fighting is not an excuse for hostility, paranoia, grandiosity, authority, rebellion, etc., but is for the sake of setting things right. It is problem-centered.
They manage somehow simultaneously to love the world as it is and to try to improve it.
In all cases there was some hope that people and nature and society could be improved.
In all cases it was as if they could see both good and evil realistically.
They respond to the challenge in a job.
A chance to improve the situation or the operation is a big reward. They enjoy improving things.
Observations generally indicate great pleasure in their children and in helping them grow into good adults.
They do not need or seek for or even enjoy very much flattery, applause, popularity, status, prestige, money, honors, etc.
Expressions of gratitude, or at least of awareness of their good fortune, are common.
They have a sense of *noblesse oblige*. It is the duty of the superior, of the one who sees and knows, to be patient and tolerant, as with children.
They tend to be attracted by mystery, unsolved problems, by the unknown and the challenging, rather than to be frightened by them.
They enjoy bringing about law and order in the chaotic situation, or in the messy or confused situation, or in the dirty and unclean situation.
They hate (and fight) corruption, cruelty, malice, dishonesty, pompousness, phoniness, and faking.
They try to free themselves from illusions, to look at the facts courageously, to take away the blindfold.
They feel it is a pity for talent to be wasted.
They do not do mean things, and they respond with anger when other people do mean things.
They tend to feel that every person should have an opportunity to develop to his

[Table continued on next page]

TABLE 1 — continued

- highest potential, to have a fair chance, to have equal opportunity.
- They like doing things well, "doing a good job," "to do well what needs doing."
- Many such phrases add up to "bringing about good workmanship."
- One advantage of being a boss is the right to give away the corporation's money, to choose which good causes to help. They enjoy giving their own money away to causes they consider important, good, worthwhile, etc. Pleasure in philanthropy.
- They enjoy watching and helping the self-actualizing of others, especially of the young.
- They enjoy watching happiness and helping to bring it about.
- They get great pleasure from knowing admirable people (courageous, honest, effective, "straight," "big," creative, saintly, etc.). "My work brings me in contact with many fine people."
- They enjoy taking on responsibilities (that they can handle well), and certainly don't fear or evade their responsibilities. They respond to responsibility.
- They uniformly consider their work to be worthwhile, important, even essential.
- They enjoy greater efficiency, making an operation more neat, compact, simpler, faster, less expensive, turning out a better product, doing with less parts, a smaller number of operations, less clumsiness, less effort, more foolproof, safer, more "elegant," less laborious.

In addition, of course, one gets many "end-answers" of the type — "I just love my baby, that's all. Why do I love him? I just do"; or "I just get a big kick out of improving the efficiency of my plant. Why? I just get a big bang out of it." Peak-experiences, intrinsic pleasures, worthwhile achievements, whatever their degree, need no further justification or validation. They are intrinsic reinforcers.

It is possible to classify these moments of reward, and to boil them down into a smaller number of categories. As I tried to do this, it quickly became apparent that the best and most "natural" categories of classification were mostly or entirely abstract "values" of an ultimate and irreducible kind, such values as truth, beauty, newness, uniqueness, justice, compactness, simplicity, goodness, neatness, efficiency, love, honesty, innocence, improvement, orderliness, elegance, growth, cleanliness, authenticity, serenity, peacefulness, and the like.

For these people the profession seems to be *not* functionally autonomous, but rather to be a carrier of, an instrument of, or an incarnation of ultimate values. For them the profession of, e.g., law is a means to the end of justice, and not an end in itself. Perhaps I can communicate my feeling for the subtle difference in this way: for one man the law is loved because it *is* justice, while another man, the pure value-free technologist, might love the law simply as an intrinsically lovable set of rules, precedents, procedures without regard to the ends or products of their use. He may be said to love the vehicle itself without reference to its ends, as one loves a game which has no end other than to be a game, e.g., chess.

I have had to learn to differentiate several kinds of identification with a "cause" or a profession or a calling. A profession can be a means to covert and repressed ends as easily as it can be an end in itself. Or, better said, it can be motivated by deficiency-needs or even neurotic needs as well as by metaneeds. It can be multiply-determined or over-determined by all or any of those needs and metaneeds in any

patterning. From the simple statement, "I am a lawyer and I love my work," one cannot assume very much.

It is my strong impression that the closer to self-actualizing, to full-humanness, etc., the person is, the more likely I am to find that his "work" is metamotivated rather than basic-need-motivated. For more highly evolved persons, "the law" is apt to be more a way of seeking justice, truth, goodness, etc., rather than financial security, admiration, status, prestige, dominance, masculinity, etc. When I ask the questions: Which aspects of your work do you enjoy most? What gives you your greatest pleasures? When do you get a kick out of your work? etc., such people are more apt to answer in terms of intrinsic values, of transpersonal, beyond-the-selfish, altruistic satisfactions, e.g., seeing justice done, doing a more perfect job, advancing the truth, rewarding virtue and punishing evil, etc.

VIII

These intrinsic values overlap greatly with the B-values, and perhaps are identical with them.

While my "data," if I may call them that, are certainly not firm enough to permit me any exactness here, I have been proceeding on the assumption that my classification of B-values already published (Maslow, 1964) is close enough to the above list of found final or intrinsic values to be useful here. Clearly, there is considerable overlap between the two lists, and they may yet approach identity. I feel it desirable to use my description of the B-values, not only because it would be theoretically pretty if I could, but also because they are operationally definable in so many different ways (Maslow, 1962b, 1964, Appendix G). That is to say, they are found at the end of so many different investigative roads, that the suspicion arises that there is something in common between these different paths, e.g., education, art, religion, psychotherapy, peak-experiences, science, mathematics, etc. If this turns out to be so, we may perhaps add as another road to final values, the "cause," the mission, the vocation, that is to say, the "work" of self-actualizing people. (It is also theoretically advantageous to speak of the B-values here because of my strong impression that self-actualizing, or more fully-human, people show, *outside* their calling, as well as in it and through it, a love for and satisfaction in these same values.)

Or, to say it in another way, people who are reasonably gratified in all their basic needs now become "metamotivated" by the B-values, or at least by "final" ultimate values in greater or lesser degree, and in one or another combination of these ultimate values.

In another phrasing: self-actualizing people are not primarily motivated (i.e., by basic needs); they are primarily metamotivated (i.e., by metaneeds = B-values).

IX

This introjection means that the self has enlarged to include aspects of the world and that therefore the distinction between self and not-self (outside, other) has been transcended.

These B-values or metamotives are, therefore, no longer *only* intrapsychic or organismic. They are equally inner and outer. The meta-needs, insofar as they are inner, and the requiredness of all that is outside the person are each both stimulus and response to each other. And they move toward becoming indistinguishable, that is, toward fusion.

This means that the distinction between self and not-self has broken down (or has been transcended). There is now less differentiation between the world and the person because he has incorporated into himself part of the world and defines himself thereby. He becomes an enlarged self, we could say. If justice or truth or lawfulness have now become so important to him that he identifies his self with them, then where are they? Inside his skin or outside his skin? This distinction comes close to being meaningless at this point because his self no longer has his skin as its boundary. The inner light now seems to be no different than the outer light.

Certainly simple selfishness is transcended here and has to be defined at higher levels. For instance, we know that it is possible for a person to get more pleasure (selfish? unselfish?) out of food through having his child eat it than through eating it with his own mouth. His self has enlarged enough to include his child. Hurt his child and you hurt him. Clearly the self can no longer be identified with the biological entity which is supplied with blood from his heart along his blood vessels. The psychological self can obviously be bigger than its own body.

Just as beloved people can be incorporated into the self, become defining characteristics of it, so also can beloved causes and values be similarly incorporated into a person's self. Many people, for instance, are so passionately identified with trying to prevent war, or racial injustice, or slums or poverty, that they are quite willing to make great sacrifices, even to the point of risking death. And very clearly, they don't mean justice for their own biological bodies alone. Something personal has now become bigger than the body. They mean justice as a general value, justice for everyone; justice as a principle. Attack upon the B-values is then also an attack upon any person who has incorporated these values into his self. Such an attack becomes a *personal* insult.

To identify one's highest self with the highest values of the world out there means, to some extent at least, a fusion with the non-self. But this is true not only for the world of nature. It is also true for other human beings. That is to say that the most highly valued part of such a person's self, then, is the same as the most highly valued part of the self of other self-actualizing people. Such selves overlap.

There are other important consequences of this incorporation of

values into the self. For instance, you can love justice and truth in the world or in a person out there. You can be made happier as your friends move toward truth and justice, and sadder as they move away from it. This is easy to understand. But supposing you see yourself moving successfully toward truth, justice, beauty, and virtue? Then of course you may find that, in a peculiar kind of detachment and objectivity toward oneself, for which our culture has no place, you will be loving and admiring yourself, in the kind of healthy self-love that Fromm (1947) has described. You can respect yourself, admire yourself, take tender care of yourself, reward yourself, feel virtuous, love-worthy, respect-worthy. You may then treat yourself with the responsibility and otherness that, for instance, a pregnant woman does, whose self now has to be defined to include not-self. So also may a person with a great talent protect it and himself as if he were a carrier of something which is simultaneously himself and not himself. He may become his own guardian, so to speak.

X

Less evolved persons seem to use their work more often for achieving gratification of lower basic needs, of neurotic needs, as a means to an end, out of habit, or as a response to cultural expectations, etc. However, it is probable that these are differences of degree. Perhaps all human beings are (potentially) metamotivated to a degree.

These people, though concretely working for, motivated by, and loyal to the law, or to family, or to science, or to psychiatry, or to teaching, or the arts, that is, to some conventional category of work, seem then to be motivated by the intrinsic or ultimate values (or ultimate facts, or aspects of reality) for which the profession is only a vehicle (Maslow, 1962a, 1962b, 1963, 1964). This is my impression from observing them, and interviewing them, e.g., asking them why they like doctoring, or just which are the most rewarding moments in running a home, or chairing a committee, or having a baby, or writing. They may meaningfully be said to be working for truth, for beauty, for goodness, for law and for order, for justice, for perfection, if I boil down to a dozen or so intrinsic values (or values of Being) all the hundreds of concrete or specific reports of what is yearned for, what gratifies, what is valued, what they work for from day to day, and why they work. (This is, of course, in addition to lower values.)

I have not deliberately worked with an *ad hoc* control group, i.e., non-self-actualizing people. *I could say that most of humanity is a control group, which is certainly true.* I do have a considerable fund of experience with the attitudes toward work of average people, immature people, neurotic and borderline people, psychopaths, etc., and there is no question whatsoever that their attitudes cluster around money, basic-need gratifications (rather than B-values), sheer habit, stimulus-binding, neurotic needs, convention, and inertia (the unexamined and non-questioned life), and from doing what other people

expect or demand. However, this intuitive common sense or naturalistic conclusion is certainly easily susceptible to more careful, more controlled and predesigned examination which could confirm or disconfirm.

It is my strong impression that there is not a sharp line between my subjects chosen as self-actualizing and other people. I believe that each self-actualizing subject with whom I have worked, more or less fits the description I have given; but it seems also true that some percentage of other, less healthy people also are metamotivated to some degree by the B-values, especially individuals with special talents and people placed in especially fortunate circumstances. Perhaps all people are metamotivated to some degree.*

The conventional categories of career, profession, or work may serve as channels of many other kinds of motivations, not to mention sheer habit or convention or functional autonomy. They may satisfy or seek vainly to satisfy any or all of the basic needs as well as various neurotic needs. They may be a channel for "acting out" or for "defensive" activities as well as for real gratifications.

My guess, supported both by my "empirical" impressions and by general psychodynamic theory, is that we will find it ultimately most true and most useful to say that all these various habits, determinants, motives, and metamotives are acting simultaneously in a very complex pattern which is centered more toward one kind of motivation or determinedness than the others. This is to say that the most highly developed persons we know are metamotivated to a much higher degree, and are basic-need-motivated to a lesser degree than average or diminished people are.

Another guess is that the dimension of "confusion" will also be relevant. I have already reported (1954, Chap. 12) my impression that my self-actualizing subjects seemed quite easily and decisively to "know right from wrong" for themselves. This contrasts sharply with the current and widely prevalent value-confusion, let us say, over Jean Genet, to take a single conspicuous example. Not only is there confusion, but also a queer kind of turning black into white, and an active hatred of the good (or trying-to-become-good) person, or of superiority, excellence, beauty, talent, etc.

"Politicians and intellectuals bore me. They seem to be unreal; the people I see a lot of these days are the ones who seem real to me: whores, thieves, junkies, etc." (From an interview with Nelson Algren.)

This hatred I have called "counter-valuing." I could as easily have called it Nietzschean *ressentiment*.

* I feel confident enough about this to suggest the founding of companies for metamotivational research. These should be as lucrative as those that specialize in so-called motivation research.

XI

The full definition of the person or of human nature must then include intrinsic values, as part of human nature.

If we then try to define the deepest, most authentic, most constitutionally based aspects of the real self, of the identity, or of the authentic person, we find that in order to be comprehensive we must include not only the person's constitution and temperament, not only anatomy, physiology, neurology, and endocrinology, not only his capacities, his biological style, not only his basic instinctoid needs, but also the B-values, which are also *his* B-values. (This should be understood as a flat rejection of the Sartre type of arbitrary existentialism in which a self is created by fiat.) They are equally part of his "nature," or definition, or essence, along with his "lower" needs, at least in my self-actualizing subjects. They must be included in any ultimate definition of "the human being," or of full-humanness, or of "a person." It is true that they are not fully evident or actualized (made real and functionally existing) in most people. And yet, so far as I can see at this time, they are not excluded as potentials in any human being born into the world. (Of course, it is conceivable that we may discover new data in the future to contradict this assumption. Also strictly semantic and theory-building considerations will ultimately be involved, e.g., what meaning shall we assign to the concept "self-actualization" in a feeble-minded person?) And in any case, I maintain that this is true for some people at least.

A fully inclusive definition of a fully developed self or person includes this kind of value-system, by which he is metamotivated.

XII

These intrinsic values are instinctoid in nature, i.e., they are needed (a) to avoid illness and (b) to achieve fullest humanness or growth. The "illnesses" resulting from deprivation of intrinsic values (meta-needs) we may call metapathologies. The "highest" values, the spiritual life, the highest aspirations of mankind are therefore proper subjects for scientific study and research. They are in the world of nature.

I wish now to advance another thesis, which comes also from (un-systematized and unplanned) observations on the contrasts between my subjects and the population in general. It is this: I have called the basic needs instinctoid or biologically necessary for many reasons (1954, Chap. 7; 1965) but primarily because the person *needs* the basic gratifications in order to avoid illness, to avoid diminution of humanness, and, positively stated, in order to move forward and upward toward self-actualization or full-humanness. It is my strong impression that something very similar holds true for the metamotivations of self-actualizing people. They seem to me to be also biological necessities in order (a) negatively, to avoid "illness" and (b) positively, to achieve full-humanness. Since these metamotivations are the intrin-

sic values of being, singly or in combination, then this amounts to contending that the B-values are instinctoid in nature.

These "illnesses" (which come from deprivation of the B-values or metaneeds or B-facts) are new and have not yet been described as such, i.e., as pathologies, except unwittingly, or by implication, or, as by Frankl (1966), in a very general and inclusive way, not yet teased apart into researchable form. In general, they have been discussed through the centuries by religionists, historians, and philosophers under the rubric of spiritual or religious shortcomings, rather than by physicians, scientists, or psychologists under the rubric of psychiatric or psychological or biological "illnesses" or stuntings or diminutions. To some extent also there is some overlap with sociological and political disturbances, "social pathologies," and the like (Table 2).

TABLE 2

GENERAL METAPATHOLOGIES

Alienation.
Anomie.
Anhedonia.
Loss of zest in life.
Meaninglessness.
Inability to enjoy. Indifference.
Boredom; ennui.
Life ceases to be intrinsically worthwhile and self-validating.
Existential vacuum.
Noogenic neurosis.
Philosophical crisis.
Apathy, resignation, fatalism.
Valuelessness.
Desacralization of life.
Spiritual illnesses and crises. "Dryness," "aridity," staleness.
Axiological depression.
Death wishes; letting go of life. One's death doesn't matter.
Sense of being useless, unneeded, of not mattering. Ineffectuality.
Hopelessness, apathy, defeat, cessation of coping, succumbing.
Feeling totally determined. Helplessness. No feeling of free will.
Ultimate doubt. Is *anything* worthwhile? Does anything matter?
Despair, anguish.
Joylessness.
Futility.
Cynicism; disbelief in, loss of faith in, or reductive explanation of all high values.
Metagrumbles (Maslow, 1965, pp. 236-246).
"Aimless" destructiveness, resentment, vandalism.
Alienation from all elders, parents, authority, from *any* society.

I will call these "illnesses" (or, better, diminutions of humanness) "metapathologies" and define them as the consequences of deprivation of the B-values either in general or of specific B-values (see Tables 2 and 3). Extrapolating out from my previous descriptions and cataloguing of the various B-values, arrived at by various operations (Maslow, 1962b), it is possible to form a kind of periodic table (Table 3) in which illnesses not yet discovered may be listed, to be looked for in the future. To the extent that they will be discovered and described, to that extent will my impressions and hypotheses be confirmed. (I have used the world of television and especially of television advertising as a rich source of metapathologies of all types, i.e., of the vulgarization

TABLE 3

B-VALUES AND SPECIFIC METAPATHOLOGIES

<i>B-Values</i>	<i>Pathogenic Deprivation</i>	<i>Specific Metapathologies</i>
1. Truth	Dishonesty	Disbelief; mistrust; cynicism; skepticism; suspicion.
2. Goodness	Evil	Utter selfishness. Hatred; repulsion; disgust. Reliance only upon self and for self. Nihilism. Cynicism.
3. Beauty	Ugliness	Vulgarity. Specific unhappiness, restlessness, loss of taste, tension, fatigue. Philistinism. Bleakness.
4. Unity; Wholeness	Chaos. Atomism, Loss of connectedness	Disintegration; "the world is falling apart." Arbitrariness.
4A. Dichotomy-Transcendence	Black and white dichotomies. Loss of gradations, of degree. Forced polarization. Forced choices	Black-white thinking, either/or thinking. Seeing everything as a duel or a war, or a conflict. Low synergy. Simplistic view of life.
5. Aliveness; Process	Deadness. Mechanizing of life	Deadness. Robotizing. Feeling oneself to be totally determined. Loss of emotion. Boredom (?); loss of zest in life. Experiential emptiness.
6. Uniqueness	Sameness; uniformity; interchangeability	Loss of feeling of self and of individuality. Feeling oneself to be interchangeable, anonymous, not really needed.
7. Perfection	Imperfection; sloppiness; poor workmanship; shoddiness	Discouragement (?); hopelessness; nothing to work for.
7A. Necessity	Accident; occasionalism; inconsistency	Chaos; unpredictability. Loss of safety. Vigilance.
8. Completion; Finality	Incompleteness	Feelings of incompleteness with perseverance. Hopelessness. Cessation of striving and coping. No use trying.
9. Justice	Injustice	Insecurity; anger; cynicism; mistrust; lawlessness; jungle world-view; total selfishness.
9A. Order	Lawlessness. Chaos. Breakdown of authority	Insecurity. Wariness. Loss of safety, of predictability. Necessity for vigilance, alertness, tension, being on guard.
10. Simplicity	Confusing complexity. Disconnectedness. Disintegration	Over-complexity; confusion; bewilderment, conflict, loss of orientation.
11. Richness; Totality; Comprehensiveness	Poverty. Coarctation	Depression; uneasiness; loss of interest in world.
12. Effortlessness	Effortfulness	Fatigue, strain, striving, clumsiness, awkwardness, gracelessness, stiffness.
13. Playfulness	Humorlessness	Grimness; depression; para-

[Table continued on next page]

TABLE 3 — *continued*

<i>B-Values</i>	<i>Pathogenic Deprivation</i>	<i>Specific Metapathologies</i>
14. Self-sufficiency	Contingency; accident; occasionalism	noid humorlessness; loss of zest in life. Cheerlessness. Loss of ability to enjoy. Dependence upon (?) the perceiver (?). It becomes his responsibility.
15. Meaningfulness*	Meaninglessness	Meaninglessness. Despair. Senselessness of life.

or destruction of all intrinsic values, although, of course, many other sources of data are readily available.)

The third column in Table 3 is a very tentative effort and should not be taken too seriously except as a pointing toward future tasks. These specific metapathologies seem to be as figure against the ground of general metapathology. The only specific metapathology with which I have dealt at length is the first one (1962a, Chap. 5), and perhaps this publication could serve as a stimulus to other efforts, quite feasible, I think, to describe other metapathologies. I suspect that reading in the literature of religious pathology, especially in the mystical tradition, would be suggestive. I would guess that leads would also be found in the realm of "chic" art, of social pathology, of homosexual subcultures, in the literature of Nay-saying existentialism (Wilson, 1967). The case histories of existential psychotherapy, spiritual illness, existential vacuum, the "dryness" and "aridity" of the mystics, the dichotomizing, verbalizing, and over-abstracting dissected by the general semanticists, the philistinism against which artists struggle, the mechanization, robotizing, and depersonalizing that social psychiatrists talk about, alienation, loss of identity, extrapunitive whining, complaining and the feeling of helplessness, suicidal tendencies, the religious pathologies that Jung talked about, Frankl's noogenic disorders, the psychoanalyst's character disorders — these and many other value disturbances are undoubtedly relevant sources of information.

To summarize: if we agree that such disturbances, illnesses, pathologies, or diminutions (coming from deprivation of metaneeded gratifications) are indeed a diminishing of full-humanness or of the human potential, and if we agree that the gratification or fulfillings of the B-values enhance or fulfill the human potential, then clearly these intrinsic and ultimate values may be taken as instinctoid needs (Maslow, 1965, pp. 33-47) in the same realm of discourse with basic needs and on the same hierarchy. These metaneeds, though having certain special characteristics which differentiate them from basic needs, are yet in the same realm of discourse and of research as, for instance, the need for vitamin C or for calcium. They fall within the realm of science, broadly conceived, and are certainly *not* the exclusive property of theologians, philosophers, or artists. The spiritual or value-life then falls well *within* the realm of nature, rather than being a different and

* These values are more extensively described in Appendix G (Maslow, 1964).

opposed realm. It is susceptible to investigation at once by psychologists and social scientists, and in theory will eventually become also a problem for neurology, endocrinology, genetics, and biochemistry as these sciences develop suitable methods.

XIII

The metapathologies of the affluent and indulged young come partly from deprivation of intrinsic values, frustrated "idealism," from disillusionment with a society they see (mistakenly) motivated only by lower or animal or material needs.

This theory of metapathology generates the following easily testable proposition: I believe that much of the social pathology of the affluent (already lower-need-gratified) is a consequence of intrinsic-value-starvation. To say it in another way: much of the bad behavior of affluent, privileged, and basic-need-gratified high school and college students is due to frustration of the "idealism" so often found in young people. My hypothesis is that this behavior can be a fusion of continued search for something to believe in, combined with anger at being disappointed. (I sometimes see in a particular young man total despair or hopelessness about even the *existence* of such values.)

Of course, this frustrated idealism and occasional hopelessness is partially due to the influence and ubiquity of stupidly limited theories of motivation all over the world. Leaving aside behavioristic and positivistic theories — or rather non-theories — as simple refusals even to see the problem, i.e., a kind of psychoanalytic denial, then what is available to the idealistic young man and woman?

Not only does the whole of official nineteenth-century science and orthodox academic psychology offer him nothing, but also the major motivation theories by which most men live can lead him only to depression or cynicism. The Freudians, at least in their official writings (though not in good therapeutic practice), are still reductionistic about all higher human values. The deepest and most real motivations are seen to be dangerous and nasty, while the highest human values and virtues are essentially fake, being not what they seem to be, but camouflaged versions of the "deep, dark, and dirty." Our social scientists are just as disappointing in the main. A total cultural determinism is still the official, orthodox doctrine of many or most of the sociologists and anthropologists. This doctrine not only denies intrinsic higher motivations, but comes perilously close sometimes to denying "human nature" itself. The economists, not only in the West but also in the East, are essentially materialistic. We must say harshly of the "science" of economics that it is generally the skilled, exact, technological application of a totally false theory of human needs and values, a theory which recognizes only the existence of lower needs or material needs (Schumacher, 1967; Weisskopf, 1963; Wootton, 1967).

How could young people not be disappointed and disillusioned? What else could be the result of *getting* all the material and animal

gratifications and then *not being happy*, as they were led to expect, not only by the theorists, but also by the conventional wisdom of parents and teachers, and the insistent gray lies of the advertisers?

What happens then to the “eternal verities”? to the ultimate truths? Most sections of the society agree in handing them over to the churches and to dogmatic, institutionalized, conventionalized religious organizations. But this is also a denial of high human nature! It says in effect that the youngster who is looking for something will definitely *not* find it in human nature itself. He must look for ultimates to a non-human, non-natural source, a source which is definitely mistrusted or rejected altogether by many intelligent young people today.

The end-product of such surfeit conditions is that material values have come more and more to dominate the scene. In the result, man’s thirst for values of the spirit has remained unquenched. Thus the civilization has reached a stage which virtually verges on disaster (E. F. Schumacher).

I have focused on the “frustrated idealism” of the young here because I consider it to be a hot research topic today. But, of course, I consider all metapathologies in anybody to be also “frustrated idealism.”

XIV

This value-starvation and value-hunger come both from external deprivation and from our inner ambivalence and counter-values.

Not only are we passively value-deprived into metapathology by the environment. We also fear the highest values, both within ourselves and outside ourselves. Not only are we attracted; we are also awed, stunned, chilled, frightened. That is to say, we tend to be ambivalent and conflicted. We defend ourselves against the B-values. Repression, denial, reaction-formation, and probably all the Freudian defense-mechanisms are available and are used against the highest within ourselves just as they are mobilized against the lowest within ourselves. Humility and a sense of unworthiness can lead to evasion of the highest values. So also can the fear of being overwhelmed by the tremendousness of these values. (In another paper [1967] I have called this the Jonah-syndrome and described it more fully.)

It is reasonable to postulate that metapathologies will result from self-deprivation as from externally imposed deprivation.

XV

The hierarchy of basic needs is prepotent to the metaneeds.

Basic needs and metaneeds are in the same hierarchical-integration, i.e., on the same continuum, in the same realm of discourse. They have the same basic characteristic of being “needed” (necessary, good for

the person) in the sense that their deprivation produces "illness" and diminution, and that their "ingestion" fosters growth toward full-humanness, toward greater happiness and joy, toward psychological "success," toward more peak-experiences, and in general toward living more often at the level of being. That is, they are *all* biologically desirable, and *all* foster biological success. And yet, they are also different in definable ways. (Biological value or success has been seen only negatively, i.e., as simple endurance in life, viability, avoidance of illness, survival of the individual and of his offspring. But we here imply also positive criteria of biological or evolutionary success, i.e., not only survival-values, but also fulfillment-values. Basic need and metaneed gratification help to make "better specimens," biological superiors, high in the dominance-hierarchy. Not only does the stronger, more dominant, more successful animal have more satisfactions, a better territory, more offspring, etc. — not only is the weaker animal lower in the dominance-hierarchy, more expendable, more likely to get eaten and less likely to reproduce, more likely to go hungry, etc., but the better specimen also lives a fuller life with more gratification and less frustration, pain, and fear. Without getting involved in trying to describe pleasure in animals — which, however, I think could be done — we can yet legitimately ask, "Is there no difference in the biological life as well as the psychological life of an Indian peasant and an American farmer, even though they both reproduce?")

First of all, it is clear that the whole hierarchy of the basic needs is prepotent to the metaneeds, or, to say it in another way, the metaneeds are postpotent (less urgent or demanding, weaker) to the basic needs. I intend this as a generalized statistical statement because I find some single individuals in whom a special-talent or a unique sensitivity makes truth or beauty or goodness, for that single person, more important and more pressing than some basic need.

Secondly, the basic needs can be called deficiency-needs, having the various characteristics already described for deficiency-needs, while the metaneeds seem rather to have the special characteristics described for "growth-motivations" (Maslow, 1962a, Chap. 3).

XVI

The metaneeds are equally potent among themselves, on the average — i.e., I cannot detect a generalized hierarchy of prepotency. But in any given individual, they may be and often are hierarchically arranged according to idiosyncratic talents and constitutional differences.

The metaneeds (or B-values, or B-facts) so far as I can make out are not arranged in a hierarchy of prepotency, but seem, all of them, to be equally potent *on the average*. Another way of saying this, a phrasing that is useful for other purposes, is that each individual seems to have his own priorities or hierarchy or prepotency, in accordance with his own talents, temperament, skills, capacities, etc. Beauty is more impor-

tant than truth to one person, but for his brother it may be the other way about with equal statistical likelihood.

XVII

It looks as if any intrinsic or B-value is fully defined by most or all of the other B-values. Perhaps they form a unity of some sort, with each specific B-value being simply the whole seen from another angle.

It is my (uncertain) impression that any B-value is fully and adequately defined by the total of the other B-values. That is, truth, to be fully and completely defined, must be beautiful, good, perfect, just, simple, orderly, lawful, alive, comprehensive, unitary, dichotomy-transcending, effortless, and amusing (Maslow, 1962b). (The formula, "The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," is certainly quite inadequate.) Beauty, fully defined, must be true, good, perfect, alive, simple, etc. It is as if all the B-values have some kind of unity, with each single value being something like a facet of this whole.

If this vague perception turns out to be confirmed, then factor analysis may possibly turn up with a "g" factor (for general) and fourteen or less "s" factors (for specific), or, at any rate, with a simpler and more economical structure of B-values than my unaided, global, and intuitive "impressions" have been able to produce.

XVIII

The value-life (spiritual, religious, philosophical, axiological, etc.) is an aspect of human biology and is on the same continuum with the "lower" animal life (rather than being in separated, dichotomized, or mutually exclusive realms). It is probably therefore species-wide, supracultural even though it must be actualized by culture in order to exist.

What all of this means is that the so-called spiritual or value-life, or "higher" life, is on the same continuum (is the same *kind* or *quality* of thing) with the life of the flesh, or of the body, i.e., the animal life, the material life, the "lower" life. That is, the spiritual life is part of our biological life. It is the "highest" part of it, but yet part of it.

The spiritual life is then part of the human essence. It is a defining-characteristic of human nature, without which human nature is not full human nature. It is part of the Real Self, of one's identity, of one's inner core, of one's specieshood, of full-humanness. To the extent that pure expressing of oneself, or pure spontaneity, is possible, to that extent will the metaneeds also be expressed. "Uncovering" or Taoistic or existential therapeutic or logotherapeutic (Frankl, 1966), or "ontogogic" techniques (Bugental, 1965), should uncover and strengthen the metaneeds as well as the basic needs.

Depth-diagnostic and therapeutic techniques should ultimately also uncover these same metaneeds because, paradoxically, our "highest nature" is also our "deepest nature." The value life and the animal life

are not in two separate realms as most religions and philosophies have assumed, and as classical, impersonal science has also assumed. The spiritual life (the contemplative, "religious," philosophical, or value-life) is within the jurisdiction of human thought and is attainable in principle by man's own efforts. Even though it has been cast out of the realm of reality by the classical, value-free science which models itself upon physics, it can be reclaimed as an object of study and technology by humanistic science. That is, such an expanded science must consider the eternal verities, the ultimate truths, the final values, and so on, to be "real" and natural, fact-based rather than wish-based, human rather than superhuman, legitimate scientific problems calling for research.

In practice, of course, such problems are more difficult to study. The lower life is prepotent over the higher life, which means that the higher is just less likely to occur. The preconditions of the metamotivated life are far more numerous, not only in terms of prior gratification of the whole hierarchy of basic needs, but also in terms of the greater number of "good conditions" (Maslow, 1964) which are needed to make the higher life possible, i.e., a far better environment is required, economic scarcity must have been conquered, a wide variety of choices must be freely available along with conditions that make real and efficient choosing possible, synergic social institutions are almost a requirement (Maslow, 1965a, 1965b), etc. In a word, we must be very careful to imply only that the higher life is in principle *possible*, and never that it is probable, or likely, or easy to attain.

Let me also make quite explicit the implication that metamotivation is species-wide, and is, therefore, supracultural, common-human, not created arbitrarily by culture. Since this is a point at which misunderstandings are fated to occur, let me say it so: the metaneeds seem to me to be instinctoid, that is, to have an appreciable hereditary, species-wide determination. But they are potentialities, rather than actualities. Culture is definitely and absolutely needed for their actualization; but also culture can fail to actualize them, and indeed this is just what most known cultures actually seem to do and to have done throughout history. Therefore, there is implied here a supracultural factor which can criticize any culture from outside and above that culture, namely, in terms of the degree to which it fosters or suppresses self-actualization, full-humanness, and metamotivation (Maslow, 1964). A culture can be synergic with human biological essence or it can be antagonistic to it, i.e., culture and biology are not in principle opposed to each other.

Can we, therefore, say that everyone yearns for the higher life, the spiritual, the B-values, etc.? Here we run full-tilt into inadequacies in our language. Certainly we can say in principle that such a yearning must be considered to be a potential in every newborn baby until proven otherwise. That is to say, our best guess is that this potentiality, if it is lost, is lost after birth. It is also socially realistic today to bet that most newborn babies will never actualize this potentiality, and will never rise to the highest levels of motivation because of poverty,

exploitation, prejudice, etc. There is, in fact, inequality of opportunity in the world today. It is also wise to say of adults that prognosis varies for each of them, depending on how and where they live, their social-economic-political circumstances, degree and amount of psychopathology, etc. And yet it is also unwise (as a matter of social strategy, if nothing else) to give up the possibility of the metalife completely and in principle for any living person. "Incurables" have, after all, been "cured" in both the psychiatric sense and in the sense of self-actualization, for example by Synanon (Maslow, 1967). And most certainly, we would be stupid to give up this possibility for future generations.

The so-called spiritual (or transcendent, or axiological) life is clearly rooted in the biological nature of the species. It is a kind of "higher" animality whose precondition is a healthy "lower" animality, i.e., they are hierarchically-integrated (rather than mutually exclusive). But this higher, spiritual "animality" is so timid and weak, and so easily lost, is so easily crushed by stronger cultural forces, that it can become widely actualized *only* in a culture which approves of human nature, and therefore actively fosters its fullest growth.

It is this consideration that offers a possible resolution of many unnecessary conflicts or dichotomies. For instance, if "spirit" *à la* Hegel and "nature" *à la* Marx are in fact hierarchically-integrated on the same continuum, which means also the usual versions of "idealism" and "materialism," then various solutions are given by the nature of this hierarchical continuum. For instance, lower needs (animal, nature, material) are prepotent in quite specific, empirical, operational, limited senses to so-called higher basic needs, which in turn are prepotent to metaneeds (spirit, ideals, values). This is to say that the "material" conditions of life are meaningfully prior to (have precedence over, are stronger than) high ideals and are even prepotent to ideology, philosophy, religion, culture, etc., also in definitely definable and limited ways. Yet these higher ideals and values are far from being mere epiphenomena of the lower values. They seem rather to have the same quality of biological and psychological reality even though differing in strength, urgency, or priority. In any hierarchy of prepotency, as in the nervous system, or as in a pecking order, the higher and the lower are equally "real" and equally human. One can certainly see history, if one wishes, from the point of view of struggle toward full-humaneness, or as the unfolding of an immanent, German-professor-type Idea, i.e., from above downward. Or one can equally find first or basic or ultimate causes in material circumstances, i.e., from below upward. (One can then accept as true the statement that "self-interest is the basis of all human nature," in the sense that it is prepotent. But it is not true in the sense of being a sufficient description of *all* human motives.) They are both useful theories for different intellectual purposes, and both have assignable psychological meanings. We need not argue over "the primacy of spirit to matter," or the other way about. If the Russians today get worried over the emergence of idealism, and

of spiritual philosophies, they needn't. From what we know of developments within individuals and within societies, a certain amount of spirituality is the extremely probable consequence of a satisfied materialism. (It is a great mystery to me why affluence releases some people for growth while permitting other people to stay fixated at a strictly "materialistic" level.) But it is just as probable that the religionist, fostering spiritual values, had better start with food, shelter, roads, etc., which are more basic than sermons.

Placing our lower-animal inheritance on the same scale as our "highest," most spiritual, axiological, valuable, "religious" (thereby saying that spirituality is *also* animal, i.e., higher-animal) helps us to transcend many other dichotomies as well. For instance, the voice of the devil, depravity, the flesh, evil, the selfish, the egocentric, self-seeking, etc., have all been dichotomized from, and opposed to, the divine, the ideal, the good, the eternal verities, our highest aspirations, etc. Sometimes the divine or the best has been conceived to be within human nature. But far more often, in the history of mankind, the good has been conceived of as external to human nature, above it, supernatural.

My vague impression is that most religions, philosophies, or ideologies have been somewhat more likely to accept the evil or the worst as intrinsic to human nature. But even our "worst" impulses have sometimes been exteriorized as, e.g., the voice of Satan, or the like.

Frequently, also, our "lowest" animal nature has automatically been maligned as "bad" (Maslow, 1954, Chap. 7) although in principle it could just as easily have been thought of as "good" — and in some cultures, has been, and is. Perhaps this maligning of our lower-animal nature is due in part to the dichotomizing itself (dichotomizing pathologizes, and pathology encourages dichotomizing, which, in a holistic world, is usually incorrect). If so, then the concept of meta-motivation should supply a theoretical basis for solving all these (mostly) false dichotomies.

XIX

Pleasures and gratifications can be arranged in hierarchy of levels from lower to higher. So also can hedonistic theories be seen as ranging from lower to higher, i.e., metahedonism.

The B-values, seen as gratifications of metaneeds, are then also the highest pleasures or happinesses that we know of.

I have suggested elsewhere (1966) the need for and usefulness of being conscious that there is a hierarchy of pleasures, ranging from, e.g., relief from pain, through the contentment of a hot tub, the happiness of being with good friends, the joy of great music, the bliss of having a child, the ecstasy of the highest love-experiences, on up to the fusion with the B-values.

Such a hierarchy suggests a solution of the problem of hedonism, selfishness, duty, etc. If one includes the highest pleasures among the

pleasures in general, then it becomes true in a very real sense that fully-human people also seek only for pleasure, i.e., metapleasure. Perhaps we can call this "metahedonism" and then point out that at this level there is then no contradiction between pleasure and duty since the highest obligations of human beings are certainly to truth, justice, beauty, etc., which however are also the highest pleasures that the species can experience. And of course at this level of discourse the mutual exclusiveness between selfishness and unselfishness has also disappeared. What is good for us is good for everyone else, what is gratifying is praiseworthy, our appetites are now trustworthy, rational, and wise, what we enjoy is good for us, seeking our own (highest) good is also seeking the general good, etc.

If one speaks of lower-need hedonism, of higher-need hedonism, and of metaneed hedonism, then this is an order from lower to higher (Maslow, 1954, Chap. 8), implying operational and testable meanings of various sorts. For instance, the higher we go, the less the frequency found in the population, the greater the number of preconditions, the better must the social environment be, the higher the quality of education must be, etc.

XX

Since the spiritual life is instinctoid, all the techniques of "subjective biology" apply to its education.

Since the spiritual life (B-values, B-facts, metaneeds, etc.) is part of the Real Self, which is instinctoid, it can in principle be introspected. It has "impulse voices" or "inner signals" which, though weaker than basic needs, can yet be "heard," and which therefore comes under the rubric of the "subjective biology" I have described (Maslow, 1965b, 1967).

In principle, therefore, all the principles and exercises which help to develop (or teach) our sensory awarenesses, our body awarenesses, our sensitivities to the inner signals (given off by our needs, capacities, constitution, temperament, body, etc.) — all these apply also, though less strongly, to our inner metaneeds, i.e., to the education of our yearnings for beauty, law, truth, perfection, etc. I have used the term "experientially empty" to describe those persons whose inner signals are either absent or remain unperceived. Perhaps we can also invent some such term as "experientially rich" to describe those who are so sensitive to the inner voices of the self that even the metaneeds can be consciously introspected and enjoyed.

It is this experiential richness which in principle should be "teachable" or recoverable, I feel confident, at least in degree, perhaps with the proper use of psychedelic chemicals, with Esalen-type, non-verbal methods,* with meditation and contemplation techniques, with further

* The Esalen Institute at Big Sur, California, specializes in such methods. The tacit assumption underlying this new kind of education is that both the body and the "spirit" can be loved, and that they are synergic and hierarchically-integrated rather than mutually exclusive, i.e., one can have both.

study of the peak-experiences, or of B-cognition, etc.

I do not wish to be understood as deifying the inner signals (the voices from within, the "still, small voice of conscience," etc.). It seems to me that experiential knowledge is certainly the beginning of all knowledge, but it is definitely not the end of all knowledge. It is necessary, but not sufficient. The voice from within can occasionally be wrong even in the wisest individual. In any case, such wise individuals generally test their inner commands against external reality whenever they can. Empirical testing and verifying of experiential knowledge is thus always in order, for sometimes the inner certainty, even of a veritable mystic, turns out to be the voice of the devil (Huxley, 1959). It is not yet wise to permit the private conscience of one person to outweigh all other sources of knowledge and wisdom, however much we respect inner experiencing.

XXI

But B-values seem to be the same as B-facts. Reality then is ultimately fact-values or value-facts.

The B-values can equally be called B-facts (or ultimate reality) at the highest levels of perspicuity (of illumination, awakening, insight, B-cognition, mystical perception, etc.) (Maslow, 1962a, Chap. 6). When the highest levels of personality development, of cultural development, of perspicuity, of emotional freeing (from fears, inhibitions, defenses), and of non-interference all coincide, then there are now some good reasons for affirming that human-independent reality is seen most clearly in its own (human-independent) nature, least distorted by observer-intrusions (Maslow, 1966). Then reality is *described* as true, good, perfect, integrated, alive, lawful, beautiful, etc. That is, the reality-describing words that are most accurate and suitable to report what is perceived are the very same words which have been traditionally called value-words. The traditional dichotomizing of *is* and *ought* turns out to be characteristic of lower levels of living, and is transcended at the highest level of living, where fact and value fuse. For obvious reasons, those words which are simultaneously descriptive and normative can be called "fusion words" (Maslow, 1967).

At this fusion level "love for the intrinsic values" is the same as "love of ultimate reality." Devotion *to* the facts here implies love *for* the facts. The sternest effort at objectivity or perception, i.e., to reduce as much as possible the contaminating effect of the observer, and of his fears and wishes and selfish calculations, yields an emotional, esthetic, and axiological result, a result pointed toward and approximated by our greatest and most perspicuous philosophers, scientists, artists, and spiritual inventors and leaders.

Contemplation of ultimate values becomes the same as contemplation of the nature of the world. Seeking the truth (fully defined) may be the same as seeking beauty, order, oneness, perfection, rightness (fully defined) and truth may then be sought *via* any other B-value.

Does science then become indistinguishable from art? love? religion? philosophy? Is a basic scientific discovery about the nature of reality also a spiritual or axiological affirmation?

If all this is so, then our attitude toward the real, or at least the reality we get glimpses of when we are at our best and when *it* is at *its* best, can no longer be only “cool,” purely cognitive, rational, logical, detached, uninvolved assent. This reality calls forth also a warm and emotional response, a response of love, of devotion, of loyalty, even peak-experiences. At its best, reality is not only true, lawful, orderly, integrated, etc.; it is also good and beautiful and lovable as well.

Seen from another angle, we could be said to be offering here implied answers to the great religious and philosophical questions about, e.g., the philosophical quest, the religious quest, the meaning of life, etc. (A great difference of course lies in the fact that the theoretical structure proposed here is offered for testing and research rather than for belief.)

It is offered tentatively as a set of hypotheses for testing and verification, or possibly non-verification. It is a network of “facts” at various levels of scientific reliability, of clinical and personological reports, and also of sheer intuitions and hunches. Or to say it in another way, I believe it in advance of the verifications which I confidently predict or gamble will come. But *you* (the reader) shouldn't. You should be more tentative even if it feels right, and even if it sits well. It is after all a set of guesses which *may* be true and which had better be checked.

If the B-values are identified with and become defining-characteristics of one's self, does this mean that reality, the world, the cosmos are therefore identified with and become defining-characteristics of the self? What can such a statement mean? Certainly this sounds like the classical mystic's fusion with the world or with his god. Also it reminds us of various Eastern versions of this meaning, e.g., that the individual self melts into the whole world and is lost.

Can we be said to be raising into meaningfulness the possibility of absolute values, at least in the same sense that reality itself may be said to be absolute? If something of the sort turned out to be meaningful, would it be merely humanistic, or might it be transhuman?

By this time, we have reached the limits of meaning-power that these words can convey. I mention them only because I wish to leave doors open, questions unanswered, problems unsolved. Clearly this is not a closed system.

XXII

Not only is man PART of nature, and it part of him, but also he must be at least minimumly isomorphic with nature (similar to it) in order to be viable in it. It has evolved him. His communion with what transcends him therefore need not be defined as non-natural or supernatural. It may be seen as a “biological” experience.

Heschel (1965, p. 87) claims that “Man's true fulfillment depends

upon communion with that which transcends him." And of course this is obviously true in one sense. But this sense needs spelling out.

We have seen that there is not an absolute chasm between man and the reality which is beyond him. He can identify with this reality, incorporate it into his own definition of his self, be loyal to it as to his self. He then becomes part of it and it becomes part of him. He and it overlap.

Phrasing it in this way builds a bridge to another realm of discourse, i.e., to the theory of biological evolution of man. Not only is man *part* of nature, but he must also be isomorphic with it to some extent. That is, he cannot be in utter contradiction to non-human nature. He cannot be utterly different from it or else he would not now exist.

The very fact of his viability proves that he is at least compatible with, acceptable to nature. He agrees with its demands and, as a species, has yielded to them at least to the extent of remaining viable. Nature has not executed him. He is politic enough, biologically speaking, to accept the laws of nature which, were he to defy them, would mean death. He gets along with it.

This is to say that in some sense he must be similar to nature. When we speak of his fusion with nature, perhaps this is part of what we mean. Perhaps his thrilling to nature (perceiving it as true, good, beautiful, etc.) will one day be understood as a kind of self-recognition or self-experience, a way of being oneself and fully functional, a way of being at home, a kind of biological authenticity, of "biological mysticism," etc. Perhaps we can see mystical or peak-fusion not only as communion with that which is most worthy of love, but also as fusion with that which *is*, because he belongs there, being truly part of what is, and being, so to speak, a member of the family :

. . . one direction in which we find increasing confidence is the conception that we are basically one with the cosmos instead of strangers to it (Gardner Murphy).

This *biological* or evolutionary version of the mystic experience or the peak-experience — here perhaps no different from the spiritual or religious experience — reminds us again that we must ultimately outgrow the obsolescent usage of "highest" as the opposite of "lowest" or "deepest." Here the "highest" experience ever described, the joyful fusion with the ultimate that man can conceive, can be seen simultaneously as the deepest experience of our ultimate personal animality and specieshood, as the acceptance of our profound biological nature as isomorphic with nature in general.

This kind of empirical, or at least naturalistic, phrasing seems to me also to make it less necessary or less tempting to define "that which transcends him" as non-human and non-natural or supernatural as Heschel does. Communion by the person with that which transcends him can be seen as a biological experience. And although the universe cannot be said to *love* the human being, it can be said at least to accept him in a non-hostile way, to permit him to endure, and to grow and, occasionally, to permit him great joy.

XXIII

The B-values are not the same as our personal attitudes toward these values, nor our emotional reactions to them. The B-values induce in us a kind of "requiredness feeling" and also a feeling of unworthiness.

The B-values had better be differentiated from our human attitudes toward these B-values, at least to the extent that is possible for so difficult a task. A listing of such attitudes toward ultimate values (or reality) included: love, awe, adoration, humility, reverence, unworthiness, wonder, amazement, marveling, exaltation, gratitude, fear, joy, etc. (Maslow, 1964, p. 94). These are clearly emotional-cognitive reactions within a person witnessing something not the same as himself, or at least verbally separable. Of course, the more the person fuses with the world in great peak or mystic experiences, the less of these intraself reactions there would be and the more the self would be lost as a separable entity.

I suppose the main reason for keeping this separability — that is, beyond the obvious advantages for theorizing and researching — is that great peak-experiences, illuminations, desolations, ecstasies, mystical fusions do not occur very often. A rather small percentage of clock time is spent in such exceptional moments even in the most reactive individuals. Far more time is spent in relatively serene contemplation and enjoyment of the ultimates (rather than climactic fusion *with* them) which have been revealed in the great illuminations. It is thus quite useful to speak of Royce-type "loyalty" (Royce, 1908) to the ultimates, and of duty, responsibility, and devotion as well.

In addition, the theoretical structure being herein set forth makes it impossible to think of these reactions to the B-values as being in any way arbitrary or accidental. From what has gone before, it is much more natural to think of these reactions as in some degree required, commanded, called-for, suitable, fitting and proper, appropriate, i.e., in some sense or other the B-values are felt to be worthy of, and even to require or command love, awe, devotion. The fully-human person presumably can't help having such reactions.

Nor should we forget that witnessing these ultimate facts (or values) often makes the person acutely conscious of his own unworthiness, of his inadequacies and shortcomings, of his ultimate existential smallness, finiteness, and powerlessness simply as a human being and as a member of the human species.

XXIV

The vocabulary to describe motivations must be hierarchical, especially since metamotivations (growth-motivations) must be characterized differently from basic needs (deficiency-needs).

This difference between intrinsic values and our attitudes toward

these values also generates a hierarchical vocabulary for motives (using this word most generally and inclusively). In another place I have called attention to the levels of gratification, pleasures, or happiness corresponding to the hierarchy of needs to metaneeds (Maslow, 1966). In addition to this, we must keep in mind that the concept of "gratification" itself is transcended at the level of metamotives or growth-motives, where satisfactions can be endless. So also for the concept of happiness which can also be altogether transcended at the highest levels. It may then easily become a kind of cosmic sadness or soberness or non-emotional contemplation. At the lowest basic need levels we can certainly talk of being driven and of desperately craving, striving, or needing, when, e.g., cut off from oxygen or experiencing great pain. As we go on up the hierarchy of basic needs, words like desiring, wishing, or preferring, choosing, wanting become more appropriate. But at the highest levels, i.e., of metamotivation, all these words become subjectively inadequate, and such words as yearning for, devoted to, aspiring to, loving, adoring, admiring, worshipping, being drawn to or fascinated by, describe the metamotivated feelings more accurately.

In addition to these feelings, we shall certainly have to face the difficult task of finding words which are capable of conveying the meaning of the *felt appropriateness*, the duty, the suitability, the sheer justice, of loving that which is intrinsically love-worthy, which deserves to be loved, which requires and even commands love, which calls for love, which one ought to love.

But all these words still assume a separation between the wanter and what he wants. How shall we describe what happens when this separation is transcended and there is some degree of identity or fusion between the person who wants and that which he wants? or between the person who wants and that which, in a sense, wants him?

This can also be phrased as a kind of Spinozistic transcendence of the free-will vs. determinism dichotomy. At the level of metamotivation, one freely, happily, and wholeheartedly embraces one's determinants. One chooses and wills one's fate, not reluctantly, not "ego-dystonic-ally," but lovingly and enthusiastically. And the greater the insight, the more "ego-syntonic" is this fusion of free-will and determinism.

XXV

The B-values call for behavioral expression or "celebration" as well as inducing subjective states.

We must agree with Heschel's (1965, p. 117) stress on "celebration" which he describes as "an act of expressing respect or reverence for that which one needs or honors. . . . Its essence is to call attention to the sublime or solemn aspects of living. . . . To celebrate is to share in a greater joy, to participate in an eternal drama."

It is well to notice that the highest values are not only receptively enjoyed and contemplated, but that they often also lead to expressive

and behavioral responses, which of course would be easier to investigate than subjective states.

Here we find still another phenomenological meaning of the "ought feeling." It feels suitable, fitting and proper, a pleasantly pressing duty, to celebrate the B-values, as if it were due them that we should, as if we owed them at least this, as if it were only fair, just, and natural that we should protect them, foster, enhance, share, and celebrate them.

XXVI

There are certain educational and therapeutic advantages in differentiating the realm (or level) of being from the realm (or level) of deficiencies, and in recognizing language differences at these levels.

I have found it most useful for myself to differentiate between the realm of being (B-realm) and the realm of deficiencies (D-realm), that is, between the eternal and the "practical." Simply as a matter of the strategy and tactics of living well and fully and of choosing one's life instead of having it determined for us, this is a help. It is so easy to forget ultimates in the rush and hurry of daily life, especially for young people. So often we are merely responders, so to speak, simply reacting to stimuli, to rewards and punishments, to emergencies, to pains and fears, to demands of other people, to superficialities. It takes a specific, conscious, *ad hoc* effort, at least at first, to turn one's attention to intrinsic things and values, e.g., perhaps seeking actual physical aloneness, perhaps exposing oneself to great music, to good people, to natural beauty, etc. Only after practice do these strategies become easy and automatic so that one can be living in the B-realm even without wishing or trying, i.e., the "unitive life," the "metallife," the "life of being," etc.

I have found this vocabulary useful also in teaching people to be more aware of values of being, of a language of being, of the ultimate facts of being, of the life of being, of unitive consciousness, etc. The vocabulary is certainly clumsy and sometimes grates on the sensibilities, but it does serve the purpose (Maslow, 1964, Appendix I: An example of B-analysis). In any case, it has already proven to be operationally useful in the planning of research.

A sub-hypothesis emerges here from my occasional observation that highly developed or matured individuals ("metapersons"?), even when meeting for the first time, can make extraordinarily quick communication with each other at the highest level of living with what I have called the B-language (Maslow, in press). At this point I will say of it only that it speaks as if B-values existed, were true and real, and were easily perceived by some but not by others, and that communication with these others can be also true and real, but must occur at a lower and less mature level of significance or of meaning.

At this moment I do not know how to put this hypothesis to the test because I have found that some people can use the vocabulary without

really understanding it, as some people can talk glibly about music or love without really experiencing either.

Other impressions, even more vague, are that along with this easy communication with the B-language also may go a great intimacy, a feeling of sharing common loyalties, of working at the same tasks, of being "simpático," of feeling kinship, perhaps of being fellow-servants.

XXVII

"Intrinsic conscience" and "intrinsic guilt" are ultimately biologically rooted.

Stimulated by Fromm's discussion of "humanistic conscience" (1941) and Horney's (1939) reconsideration of Freud's "superego," other humanistic writers have agreed that there is an "intrinsic conscience" beyond the superego, as well as "intrinsic guilt" which is a deserved self-punishment for betrayal of the intrinsic self.

I believe that the biological rooting of metamotivation theory can clarify and solidify these concepts further.

Horney and Fromm, revolting against the specific content of Freud's instinct theory, and probably also because of a too ready acceptance of social determinism, rejected any version of biological theory and "instinct theory." That this is a serious mistake is more readily discerned against the background of this paper.

One's personal biology is beyond question a *sine qua non* component of the "Real Self." Being oneself, being natural or spontaneous, being authentic, expressing one's identity, all these are also biological statements since they imply the acceptance of one's constitutional, temperamental, anatomical, neurological, hormonal, and instinctoid-motivational nature. Such a statement is in both the Freudian line and in the Neo-Freudian line (not to mention Rogerian, Jungian, Sheldonian, Goldsteinian, *et al.*). It is a cleansing and a correction of what Freud was groping toward and of necessity glimpsed only vaguely. I therefore consider it to be in the *echt*-Freudian or "*epi*-Freudian" tradition. I think Freud was trying to say something like this with his various instinct theories. I believe also that this statement is an acceptance of, plus an improvement upon, what Horney was trying to say with her concept of a Real Self.

If my more biological interpretation of an intrinsic self is corroborated, then it would also support the differentiation of neurotic guilt from the intrinsic guilt which comes from defying one's own nature and from trying to be what one is not.

But in view of what has gone before, we should have to include the intrinsic values or values of being in this intrinsic self. In theory, then, a betrayal of truth or justice or beauty or any other B-value should be expected to generate intrinsic guilt (metaguilt?), a guilt that would be deserved and biologically sound. This is in about the same sense that pain is ultimately a blessing because it tells us that we are doing something that is bad for us. When we betray the B-values, we hurt, and

in a certain sense, we should hurt. Furthermore, this implies a reinterpretation of the "need for punishment," which can also be positively phrased as a wish, *via* expiation, to feel "clean" again (Mowrer, 1964).

XXVIII

Many of the ultimate religious functions are fulfilled by this theoretical structure.

From the point of view of the eternal and absolute that mankind has always sought, it may be that the B-values could also, to some extent, serve this purpose. They are *per se*, in their own right, not dependent upon human vagaries for their existence. They are perceived, not invented. They are trans-human and trans-individual. They exist beyond the life of the individual. They can be conceived to be a kind of perfection. They could conceivably satisfy the human longing for certainty.

And yet they are also human in a specifiable sense. They are not only his, but him as well. They command adoration, reverence, celebration, sacrifice. They are worth living for and dying for. Contemplating them or fusing with them gives the greatest joy that a human being is capable of.

Immortality also has a quite definite and empirical meaning in this context, for the values incorporated into the person as defining-characteristics of his self live on after his death, i.e., in a certain real sense, his self transcends death.

And so for other functions that the organized religions have tried to fulfill. Apparently all, or almost all, the characteristically religious experiences that have ever been described in any of the traditional religions, in their own local phrasings, whether theist or non-theist, Eastern or Western, can be assimilated to this theoretical structure and can be expressed in an empirically meaningful way, i.e., phrased in a testable way.

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